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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.    
Appellant Luther Glenn was tried and convicted of 
the murder of William Anthony Griffin in the Court of 
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Common Pleas of Allegheny County (“Court of Common 
Pleas”) and is currently a prisoner of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania.  Glenn appeals the ruling of the United 
States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania (“District Court”) denying his Petition for a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  He 
argues that (1) the Court of Common Pleas violated his 
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial 
after an eyewitness proffered contradictory testimony, 
opting instead to strike the entirety of this testimony and 
provide cautionary jury instructions, and (2) after the 
Court of Common Pleas struck this testimony, his trial 
counsel was ineffective in not moving to strike other 
evidence in the record that referred to this witness’s 
identification of Glenn as the murderer.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
I. 
On December 17, 1997, William Anthony Griffin 
was shot and killed on Sterrett Street in the Homewood 
neighborhood of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  Days later, 
on December 22, 1997, Glenn was arrested after fleeing 
from the police in a stolen vehicle.  He was subsequently 
charged with Griffin’s murder.   
Glenn’s trial in the Court of Common Pleas took 
place in June of 1999.  During that trial, Georgianna 
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Cotton testified that she witnessed Glenn murder Griffin.  
Cotton originally testified that after leaving a bar at 5:00 
AM, intoxicated to the point of staggering,
1
 she 
encountered Griffin on Sterrett Street and engaged in a 
brief conversation with him.  As she made her way into a 
nearby partially abandoned building to smoke marijuana 
and crack cocaine, she saw Glenn standing on the corner 
of Sterrett Street and Kelly Street, talking with some of 
his friends.  Cotton entered the building, climbed the 
stairs to the second floor, and began smoking crack 
cocaine on a balcony that overlooked the street.
2
  She 
soon heard (and possibly saw) Glenn and Griffin arguing, 
and then heard Glenn tell Griffin he was going to kill 
him.
3
  Id.  Shortly thereafter, Cotton saw Glenn walk 
around the corner onto Kelly Street and saw Griffin enter 
the first floor of the building she was in.  Within a few 
seconds, she saw Glenn return in a blue station wagon, 
pull up in front of the building, and jump out of the car 
brandishing a pistol sideways.  She saw Glenn pull a 
                                                 
1
  Cotton originally testified that she drank “7 or 8” 
Budweisers.  She later testified that she drank four 
Budweisers, seven cans of St. Ides (malt liquor), and three 
shots of Hennessy between 2:30 AM and 5:00 AM. 
2
  Cotton admitted that she had used crack cocaine for 
seven years prior to the night of the murder.  She also 
admitted that she was on probation for theft and other charges 
at the time. 
3
  Cotton first testified that she could not see the two men 
arguing, but shortly thereafter testified she could see them. 
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hoodie over his head, run towards Griffin—who was then 
standing in the doorway of the building—and shoot him 
six times.  She then saw Glenn return to the car and 
leave.  Finally, Cotton testified that, as she was running 
down to check on Griffin, she encountered Dwayne 
Youngblood (“Youngblood”), the occupant of a first-
floor apartment in the building in which Griffin was shot, 
who told her not to say anything about the murder she 
had just witnessed. 
 On cross-examination, Cotton began to contradict 
herself.  She testified that she had not actually seen the 
shooter’s face, but was able to identify Glenn based on 
what people told her on the streets.  On redirect, she 
testified that she was present during the murder, but that 
she “was also threatened.”  At that point, the judge 
declared a recess to address Cotton’s contradictory 
testimony in his chambers.  During this in camera 
proceeding, Cotton at first told the judge that she had 
indeed witnessed the murder, but that she had been 
threatened “[b]y the defendant’s people on the street.”  
After receiving promises that she would not be 
prosecuted for perjury, she then said that she did not see 
the murder, but that people told her Glenn was the 
murderer.  She went on to equivocate about whether 
Youngblood (the first-floor resident) had asked her to 
testify against Glenn or specifically asked her not to 
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testify against Glenn.
4
  Thereafter, the judge adjourned 
the trial until the following day to provide the prosecutor 
with an opportunity to assess his case and decide how to 
proceed.  In the interim, the Commonwealth granted 
Cotton immunity from any potential perjury charges and 
she received a court-appointed attorney.   
The next day, Cotton again took the stand.  On 
redirect-examination, she testified that during the 
previous day’s in camera proceeding she had told the 
attorneys and the trial judge that she had not seen Glenn 
kill Griffin.  When the Commonwealth asked her to 
provide a truthful account of what, if anything, she saw 
or heard, she claimed that she heard arguing and 
gunshots, but did not see anything until after the 
shooting, when she witnessed Glenn and “a couple other 
guys” running away from the crime scene and jumping 
into a car.  When asked why she changed her story, she 
claimed that she “was scared for somebody else’s life 
that knew what happened.”  On recross-examination, 
however, Cotton testified that she did see shots being 
                                                 
4
  This testimony was a source of confusion between the 
attorneys and the trial judge.  See, e.g., J.A. 612 (Glenn’s trial 
counsel explaining to the trial judge that “I really didn’t 
understand what [Cotton] said yesterday in chambers even.  
That’s why I asked you to have the court reporter transcribe 
it.  Maybe I’m stupid, but I couldn’t figure out what she was 
saying.”). 
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fired, at which point Glenn’s counsel moved for a 
mistrial.  In response, the judge declared a recess. 
After some discussion between the court and 
counsel, the judge denied the motion for a mistrial but 
invited defense counsel to move to strike Cotton’s entire 
testimony from the record.  Glenn’s counsel promptly did 
so.  Thereafter, the judge returned the jury to the 
courtroom and issued the following instructions: 
THE COURT:  Good afternoon, ladies and 
gentlemen.  The Court has made the 
following ruling on its own motion:  You are 
to completely [and] totally disregard the 
testimony of Ms. Cotton.  Her testimony is 
not to play any part in your determination as 
to the facts in this case.  It is as if she has not 
testified.  Do you understand that, ladies and 
gentlemen? 
THE JURY:  Yes. 
J.A. 645. 
Cotton’s testimony was not the only incriminating 
evidence offered at trial.  The Commonwealth also 
presented testimony from Jerry Pratt, an inmate who 
shared a cell with Glenn in the Allegheny County Jail 
after Glenn’s arrest.  Pratt testified that, on January 28, 
1998, Glenn told him that he had murdered Griffin in the 
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Homewood neighborhood of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
following an argument over “a bad drug deal.”  Glenn 
also told him that a female had witnessed the crime from 
the balcony of an apartment building, but that her 
testimony would not hold up in court because she was a 
crack addict and because her view was obscured.  When 
Pratt opined that this testimony could still be damaging, 
Glenn responded “I’m really not worried about it, 
because I have a person out there who can take care of 
her for me.”  J.A. 706.  Glenn identified that person as 
Monte Blair.  
The Commonwealth then offered evidence that 
two days before the alleged conversation between Glenn 
and Pratt police had engaged in a vehicle pursuit of Blair, 
in which Blair had crashed his vehicle but escaped on 
foot.  When police searched Blair’s wrecked vehicle, 
they recovered a .45 caliber Glock semi-automatic 
handgun loaded with 13 rounds of ammunition and 
equipped with a laser sight.  During summation, the 
Commonwealth argued that when police engaged Blair’s 
vehicle he was en route to murder Cotton in order to 
prevent her from testifying. 
 The Commonwealth also presented testimony from 
Charina Johnson, who was involved in a sexual 
relationship with Glenn prior to Griffin’s murder.  
Johnson told the jury that Glenn had asked her to testify 
that he was at her house at the time of the murder but that 
she had refused to do so.  She went on to testify that she 
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could not remember if he was there, though she was 
impeached with a prior statement that Glenn was not 
there and had asked her to lie.
5
 
Finally, the Commonwealth presented testimony 
from Youngblood that Glenn had been at his residence 
(located in the apartment building where Griffin was 
shot) six to seven hours before the shooting occurred. 
 At the close of the trial, the judge reiterated his 
earlier instruction to disregard Cotton’s testimony: 
THE COURT:  [Y]ou must not consider any 
testimony . . . which I have ordered stricken 
from the record.  So that it is clear, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, I ordered st[r]icken from the 
record the testimony of Ms. Cotton.  You 
must not, I repeat, must not, consider that 
testimony for any reason whatsoever.  It 
should be as if that witness never took the 
stand.  
J.A. 884. 
On June 11, 1999, the jury convicted Glenn of 
first-degree murder and the judge sentenced him to life 
imprisonment.  Glenn then filed post-sentencing motions, 
                                                 
5
  Johnson signed this prior statement during an August 
10, 1998 interview with the prosecutor in the presence of a 
police officer. 
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which were denied on October 25, 1999.  Thereafter, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court (“Superior Court”) affirmed 
his conviction and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 
 After unsuccessfully pursuing collateral relief in 
the Pennsylvania courts, Glenn timely filed a Petition for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the District Court on April 
18, 2006.  On September 19, 2012, the District Court 
denied his petition, but later granted a certificate of 
appealability on the following issues:  (1) whether the 
Court of Common pleas violated Glenn’s due process 
rights when it refused to grant a mistrial, opting instead 
to strike Cotton’s testimony, and (2) whether, after 
Cotton’s testimony was stricken, trial counsel was 
ineffective in not moving to strike other evidence 
referring to Cotton’s identification of Glenn as the 
shooter.  Glenn timely appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over Glenn’s claims by virtue 
of the District Court’s certificate of appealability and 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  The District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2241, and 
2254.  We review the District Court’s decision de novo, 
as it did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on these 
claims.  Duncan v. Morgan, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
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Our review of Glenn’s habeas petition is governed 
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides: 
(d)  An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
shall not be granted . . . unless the 
adjudication of the claim [raised] – 
(1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of 
the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding. 
 Glenn pursues both of his present claims under 
subsection (d)(1), and argues that the Superior Court’s 
decision finding neither a due process violation nor a 
Sixth Amendment violation involved “unreasonable 
application[s]” of “clearly established Federal law.”  Id.  
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III. 
Glenn’s first claim is that the Court of Common 
Pleas violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment when it denied his motion for 
a mistrial based on Cotton’s inconsistent testimony.   
Importantly, this claim requires more than a showing that 
the Court of Common Pleas erred under Pennsylvania 
law.  See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) 
(“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to 
reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 
questions.”).  Rather, the scope of our review is “the 
narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of 
supervisory power [we] would possess in regard to [our] 
own trial court.”  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 
637, 642 (1974).   
To prevail on his due process claim, Glenn must 
prove that he was deprived of “fundamental elements of 
fairness in [his] criminal trial.”  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 
U.S. 127, 149 (1992) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Glenn must tread a steep hill.  The 
Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions 
that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly, based 
on the recognition that, beyond the specific guarantees 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause 
has limited operation.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 
437, 443 (1992).  In order to satisfy due process, Glenn’s 
trial must have been fair; it need not have been perfect.  
See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508 (1983). 
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Glenn argues that Cotton’s unreliable testimony 
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  He insists that 
the trial judge’s curative instructions could not purge the 
record of the taint from this testimony and that a mistrial 
was the only constitutionally adequate remedy.  It is well 
established that, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given them 
by the court.  See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 
(1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987); 
United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Glenn, however, urges us to abandon that 
presumption because, in his view, most of the remaining 
evidence in his case “directly or tangentially related to 
Cotton’s identification of Glenn as the shooter” and, 
accordingly, “no jury could render an impartial verdict 
. . . without Cotton’s trial testimony on some level 
seeping into the deliberations.”  Appellant’s Br. 30.   
In support of this argument, Glenn relies upon 
three cases wherein we concluded that curative 
instructions were insufficient to purge the record of 
inadmissible evidence because that evidence was too 
difficult for the jury to ignore.  Each of these cases is 
distinguishable. 
  In United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155, 160 (3d 
Cir. 2009), the jury, during deliberations, discovered 
handwriting on the back of a hotel room registration card 
indicating that the defendant had extended his stay 
through the date on which police found illegal narcotics 
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in his room.  This information, which had never been 
disclosed to the defense, “had much of the credibility of 
properly admitted evidence” and “entirely defeat[ed]” the 
defendant’s argument that he had checked out of the 
room days earlier.  Id. at 163.  Though the jury was 
instructed to ignore this evidence, on appeal we held that 
“[u]nder these highly unusual circumstances” we would 
not assume that the jury was able to ignore “the elephant 
in the deliberation room.”  Id. at 163-64.  In contrast, the 
jury in Glenn’s case was repeatedly instructed to ignore 
testimony that had already been cast into doubt by 
defense counsel’s successful cross-examination.  This 
testimony would have been far easier for Glenn’s jury to 
disregard than the veritable smoking gun discovered by 
Lee’s jury in the eleventh hour of his trial. 
We view Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 
2008), as similarly distinguishable.  In Vazquez, the jury 
was asked to ignore a non-testifying co-defendant’s 
statement implicating the defendant in a murder because 
the statement violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).  550 F.3d at 272-75.  The 
statement there had not been revealed until closing 
arguments and therefore had not been discredited in any 
way.  Here, Cotton’s testimony had been severely 
discredited during cross-examination.  Further, in 
Vazquez, the jury, after receiving instructions to ignore 
the co-defendant’s statement, asked the judge during 
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deliberations whether it was “supposed to not consider 
[the co-defendant’s] statement that Vazquez was the 
shooter,” which we considered to be direct evidence that 
the original instruction “was not completely effective, if 
effective at all.”  Id. at 275.  The jury in Glenn’s case 
never suggested any such misunderstanding.      
Finally, Glenn’s reliance on Moore v. Morton, 255 
F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2001), is likewise unavailing.  In Moore, 
we found curative instructions to be inadequate to purge 
the record of three wildly inappropriate arguments made 
by the prosecutor during summation that “asked the jury 
to decide the case on bias and emotion rather than on the 
evidence presented.”  Id. at 118.  Moore involved 
prosecutorial misconduct, while no such issue is before 
us in this case.  Moreover, we relied heavily in Moore on 
the weakness of the remaining evidence against the 
defendant, which consisted primarily of testimony based 
on hypnotically enhanced memory.  See id. at 111-13, 
119.  Here, the Commonwealth offered ample evidence 
of Glenn’s guilt, including, inter alia, evidence that he 
had admitted guilt to a fellow inmate.  Moore is simply 
not analogous.
6
   
                                                 
6
  The District Court also held that Moore was not 
“clearly established Federal law determined by the Supreme 
Court” for purposes of AEDPA because it was decided by a 
lower federal court and was decided after the Superior 
Court’s judgment.  This analysis is wrong.  Glenn does not 
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Because we presume that Glenn’s jury was able to 
follow the instructions to disregard Cotton’s unreliable 
testimony, this testimony did not render Glenn’s trial 
“fundamentally unfair.”  Accordingly, the Superior 
Court’s decision affirming his conviction was not error, 
much less an “unreasonable application” of “clearly 
established Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
IV. 
Glenn also argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective in not moving to strike lingering references to 
Cotton’s identification of the shooter after the trial judge 
struck her testimony from the record.  Glenn argues that 
because of this failure “the trial court’s remedy of 
striking Cotton’s testimony was largely meaningless.”  
Appellant’s Br. 45.   
                                                                                                             
argue that the Superior Court unreasonably applied Moore 
itself, but that Moore, as factually analogous precedent, is 
evidence that the Superior Court unreasonably applied 
Supreme Court precedent concerning broader principles of 
due process.  See Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 
F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[W]e do not believe 
federal habeas courts are precluded from considering the 
decisions of inferior federal courts when evaluating whether 
the state court’s application of the law was reasonable . . . . 
[I]n certain cases it may be appropriate to consider [these 
decisions] as helpful amplifications of Supreme Court 
precedent.”). 
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To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Glenn 
must prove (1) that his trial counsel’s performance was 
“deficient, that is, it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,” and (2) “that counsel’s deficient 
performance prejudiced” him, i.e., that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”  Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 
127 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-92 
(1984)).  We have previously referred to these as the 
“performance” and “prejudice” prongs of the Strickland 
test.  See, e.g., United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 
(3d Cir. 2005).   
  Glenn identifies six pieces of evidence that his 
trial counsel should have moved to strike.  With respect 
to five of these pieces of evidence, Glenn’s claim is 
procedurally defaulted.  With respect to the remaining 
piece of evidence, his claim lacks merit. 
A. 
In his habeas proceeding in the District Court, 
Glenn identified, for the first time, five pieces of 
evidence that his trial counsel should have moved to 
strike: 
1) The Commonwealth’s opening discussing 
[sic] the testimony of Cotton, 
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2) Police testimony that Glenn’s photo was 
shown to Cotton because a confidential 
informant had identified Petitioner as the 
shooter, 
3) Police testimony that Cotton had identified 
the shooter as “Ray-Ray,” Glenn having 
been identified at trial as going by the name 
“Ray-Ray,” 
4) Police testimony that Cotton had identified 
the shooter as having short hair at the time 
of the shooting, Glenn having been 
identified at trial as having short hair a few 
days after the shooting, and 
5) Police testimony that the shooter was 
identified by Cotton as having worn a blue 
jacket with yellow letters on it, Glenn 
having been identified at trial as having 
worn a blue jacket with yellow letters on it 
close to the time of the Griffin homicide. 
J.A. 63-64. 
Because Glenn failed to identify these claims in his 
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, he is now 
time-barred from raising them in the Pennsylvania courts.  
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b).  Ordinarily, this 
procedural default would constitute an independent and 
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adequate state law ground for the Superior Court’s 
decision and would bar our review.  See Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991).  Glenn, however, 
urges us to excuse this default under Martinez v. Ryan, 
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), because his PCRA 
counsel’s failure to raise these claims itself constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Procedural default may be excused when the 
petitioner can prove both “cause” for the default and 
“actual prejudice” that resulted from the failure of the 
state court to hear the claim.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.  
Under Martinez, the failure of collateral attack counsel to 
raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in an 
initial-review collateral proceeding
7
 can constitute 
“cause” if (1) collateral attack counsel’s failure itself 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland and (2) the underlying ineffective assistance of 
                                                 
7
  Martinez applies only to “initial-review” collateral 
proceedings—collateral proceedings that provide the first 
opportunity for a petitioner to pursue his ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim.  Id. at 1315.  Because Glenn 
was represented by the same attorney at trial and on direct 
appeal, his PCRA proceeding provided the first opportunity to 
pursue his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.  See 
Com. v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1177 n.6 (Pa. 1999) 
(“[W]here a petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel are the 
same, counsel would not generally be permitted to claim his 
own ineffectiveness in . . . direct appeal proceedings.”).     
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trial counsel claim is “a substantial one,” which is to say 
“the claim has some merit.”  132 S. Ct. at 1319.   
Because Glenn’s underlying ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claims are not “substantial,” we conclude 
that default was not excused. 
1. 
In four of Glenn’s five procedurally defaulted 
claims, he argues that his trial counsel should have 
moved to strike police testimony that referred to Cotton’s 
identification of Glenn in order to explain the course of 
Griffin’s homicide investigation.  We hold that these 
claims are not “substantial” and, therefore, that the 
District Court correctly refused to excuse their default. 
First, any failure by Glenn’s trial counsel to move 
to strike this evidence from the record was not 
“objectively unreasonable” under Strickland because this 
evidence was at least arguably admissible.  In 
Pennsylvania, “certain out-of-court statements offered to 
explain the course of police conduct are admissible on 
the basis that they are offered not for the truth of the 
matters asserted but rather to show the information upon 
which police acted.”  Commonwealth v. Jones, 658 A.2d 
746, 751 (Pa. 1995).  While Glenn is correct that not all 
such statements are admissible, and that Pennsylvania 
courts are required to “balance the prosecution’s need for 
the statements against any prejudice arising therefrom,” 
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id., it is not clear that the Court of Common Pleas would 
have assessed this balance in favor of Glenn, given the 
minimal prejudicial value of this evidence, as discussed 
below.  Because a reasonable attorney could have 
concluded that this testimony was admissible, we cannot 
say that trial counsel’s failure to move to strike it from 
the record was “objectively unreasonable” under 
Strickland.   
Second, trial counsel’s failure to move to strike 
this evidence was not prejudicial because the jury was 
not likely to have attributed much, if any, weight to it.  
The jury had little reason to trust Cotton after being 
exposed to the various contradictions in her testimony, 
defense counsel’s successful impeachment of her, and the 
instructions from the trial judge to disregard her 
testimony entirely.  In fact, the police testimony referring 
to Cotton’s identification of Glenn may well have been 
prejudicial to the Commonwealth, insofar as it suggested 
that the police investigation against Glenn was based in 
part upon information received from an unreliable 
informant.  The other evidence presented, including 
Pratt’s detailed and independently corroborated 
testimony regarding Glenn’s jailhouse confession, 
provided an ample basis for the jury’s verdict.  
Accordingly, any lingering references to Cotton’s 
identification of Glenn as the shooter were unlikely to 
have a material effect on the jury’s ultimate finding of 
guilt.   
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Because there is no merit to Glenn’s underlying 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, we agree 
with the District Court that the procedural default of 
these claims is not excused under Martinez.   
2. 
Glenn’s fifth procedurally defaulted claim is that 
his trial counsel should have moved to strike references 
to Cotton’s testimony in the prosecutor’s opening 
statements.  This claim, too, is insubstantial.  These 
statements were not prejudicial to Glenn because the jury 
was repeatedly instructed not to consider the arguments 
of counsel as evidence.  In fact, considering that the 
prosecution failed to produce the testimony it had 
promised, these statements most likely prejudiced the 
prosecution, not the defense.  See McAleese v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166-67 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The 
failure of counsel to produce evidence which [sic] he 
promised the jury during his opening statement that he 
would produce is indeed a damaging failure . . . .”).  
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the 
procedural default of this claim is not excused under 
Martinez. 
B. 
Finally, we address Glenn’s claim that his trial 
counsel should have moved to strike evidence “regarding 
photo arrays in which the defendant’s photo was 
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identified by Georgina Cotton.”  While this claim, unlike 
the previous five claims, was preserved in Glenn’s PCRA 
petition, we conclude that it lacks merit.  We cannot say 
that the failure of Glenn’s trial counsel to move to strike 
this evidence was “objectively unreasonable” given that 
the photo arrays, like the police testimony discussed 
above, were arguably admissible to explain the course of 
the investigation into Griffin’s death.  Further, this 
evidence was not prejudicial to Glenn given the vigorous 
attack by the defense on Cotton’s credibility and the 
strength of the other evidence against Glenn, including 
Pratt’s testimony about the jailhouse confession. 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment and deny Glenn’s Petition for a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
